Network Working Group R. Hammett, Ed. Internet-Draft 10 August 2020 Intended status: Informational Expires: 11 February 2021 ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 JSON Specification Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 February 2021. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Terms and definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Supported KAS-FFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. Test Types and Test Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6.1. Test Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 1] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 6.2. Test Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6.2.1. KAS-ECC Requirements Covered . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6.2.2. KAS-ECC Requirements Not Covered . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Capabilities Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.1. Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.2. Prerequisite Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.3. Algorithm Capabilities JSON Values . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.4. Supported KAS ECC Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.5. KAS ECC Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.5.1. KAS ECC Scheme Capabilities JSON Values . . . . . . . 11 7.6. Example KAS-ECC Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 8. Generation Requirements per Party per Scheme . . . . . . . . 23 9. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 9.1. Test Groups JSON Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 9.1.1. KDF Configuration JSON Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 9.1.2. MAC Configuration JSON Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 9.2. Test Case JSON Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 9.2.1. KDF Parameter JSON Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 9.3. Example Test Vectors JSON Object KAS-FFC . . . . . . . . 34 10. Test Vector Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 10.1. Example Test Results KAS-ECC JSON Object . . . . . . . . 38 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 13. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 1. Acknowledgements There are no acknowledgements. 2. Abstract This document defines the JSON schema for testing SP800-56Ar3 KAS ECC implementations with the ACVP specification. Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 2] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 3. Introduction The Automated Crypto Validation Protocol (ACVP) defines a mechanism to automatically verify the cryptographic implementation of a software or hardware crypto module. The ACVP specification defines how a crypto module communicates with an ACVP server, including crypto capabilities negotiation, session management, authentication, vector processing and more. The ACVP specification does not define algorithm specific JSON constructs for performing the crypto validation. A series of ACVP sub-specifications define the constructs for testing individual crypto algorithms. Each sub- specification addresses a specific class of crypto algorithms. This sub-specification defines the JSON constructs for testing SP800-56Ar3 KAS ECC implementations using ACVP. 4. Terms and definitions No terms and definitions are listed in this document. 5. Supported KAS-FFCs The following key derivation functions MAY be advertised by the ACVP compliant cryptographic module: * KAS-FFC / null / SP800-56Ar3 6. Test Types and Test Coverage The ACVP server performs a set of tests on the KAS protocol in order to assess the correctness and robustness of the implementation. A typical ACVP validation session SHALL require multiple tests to be performed for every supported permutation of KAS capabilities. This section describes the design of the tests used to validate implementations of KAS algorithms. 6.1. Test Types There are two test types for KAS testing: * "AFT" - Algorithm Function Test. In the AFT test mode, the IUT SHALL act as a party in the Key Agreement with the ACVP server. The server SHALL generate and provide all necessary information for the IUT to perform a successful key agreement; both the server and IUT MAY act as party U/V, as well as recipient/provider to key confirmation. Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 3] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 * "VAL" - Validation Test. In the VAL test mode, The ACVP server MUST generate a complete (from both party U and party V's perspectives) key agreement, and expects the IUT to be able to determine if that agreement is valid. Various types of errors MUST be introduced in varying portions of the key agreement process (changed DKM, changed key, changed hash digest, etc), that the IUT MUST be able to detect and report on. 6.2. Test Coverage The tests described in this document have the intention of ensuring an implementation is conformant to [SP800-56Ar3]. 6.2.1. KAS-ECC Requirements Covered * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.1 Cryptographic Hash Functions. SHA1, SHA2, and SHA3 hash functions SHALL be available for the various pieces of KAS requiring use of a hash function; such as approved MACs and OneStep KDF. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.2 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Algorithms. AES-CMAC, HMAC, and KMAC algorithms SHALL be available for testing under KDFs and KC as the specification states. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.3 Random Number Generation. Though random values are used, the testing of the construction of those random values SHALL NOT be in scope of ACVP testing. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.4 Nonces. Though nonces are used, the testing of the construction of those nonces SHALL NOT be in scope of ACVP testing. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.5 Domain Parameters. Domain Parameters SHALL be used in the testing of KAS as per the specification, though the generation of those parameters is outside the scope of testing. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.6 Key-Pair Generation. Each KAS scheme from one or both parties utilizes a key pair for arriving at a shared secret, and deriving a key. Though a key pair(s) are utilized in ACVP testing, the testing of the generation of said key pairs is outside the scope of this testing. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.7 DLC Primitives. Diffie Hellman and MQV SHALL be tested under their respective KAS schemes. Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 4] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.8 Key-Derivation Methods for Key-Establishment Schemes. The ACVP server SHALL make various KDFs available for testing. The KDFs covered under ACVP server testing SHALL include the KDFs specified in SP800-56B, SP800-56C, SP800-108, and SP800-135 (where applicable). * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.9 KeyConfirmation. The ACVP server SHALL support key confirmation for applicable KAS and KTS schemes. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 6 Key Agreement Schemes. The ACVP server SHALL support testing for all KAS schemes specified in the SP800-56Ar3 document. * SP 800-56Cr1 - 4 One-Step Key Derivation. One-Step Key Derivation testing SHALL be supported by the ACVP server. FixedInfo construction is covered within the ACVP specification, and can be tailored to the IUTs needs. ASN.1 format of fixedInfo construction (currently) is NOT supported. * SP 800-56Cr1 - 5 Two-Step Key Derivation. Two-Step Key Derivation testing SHALL be supported by the ACVP server. FixedInfo construction is covered within the ACVP specification, and can be tailored to the IUTs needs. ASN.1 format of fixedInfo construction (currently) is NOT supported. * SP 800-108 - 4 Pseudorandom Function (PRF). All iterations of the KDF described in SP800-108 use a separate PRF. All implementations of the PRF SHALL be available for testing through the ACVP server generated tests. * SP 800-108 - 5 Key Derivation Functions (KDF). The three implementations of KDFs in SP800-108 SHALL be available for testing through the ACVP Server. 6.2.2. KAS-ECC Requirements Not Covered * SP 800-56Ar3 - 4.3 DLC-based Key-Transport Process. KeyWrapping is not incorporated into ACVP testing. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.3 Random Number Generation. Though random values are used, the testing of the construction of those random values SHALL NOT be in scope of ACVP testing. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.4 Nonces. Though nonces are used, the testing of the construction of those nonces SHALL NOT be in scope of ACVP testing. Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 5] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.5 Domain Parameters. Domain Parameters SHALL be used in the testing of KAS as per the specification, though the generation of those parameters is outside the scope of testing. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.6 Key-Pair Generation. Each KAS scheme from one or both parties utilizes a key pair for arriving at a shared secret, and deriving a key. Though a key pair(s) are utilized in ACVP testing, the testing of the generation of said key pairs is outside the scope of this testing. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.6.2 Required Assurances. IUT assurance testing is outside the scope of ACVP testing. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.6.2 Key Pair Management. Testing the IUT's management of Key Pairs is outside the scope of ACVP testing. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 5.8.1.2 The ASN.1 Format for FixedInfo. The ACVP server (currently) SHALL NOT support the testing of this format of fixed info. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 7 Rationale for Selecting a Specific Scheme. There is no testing associated with the IUT's choice of selecting a specific scheme. * SP 800-56Ar3 - 8 Key Recovery. Key Recovery SHALL NOT be within the scope of ACVP testing. * SP 800-56Cr1 - 4 One-Step Key Derivation. ASN.1 format of fixedInfo construction (currently) is NOT supported. * SP 800-56Cr1 - 5 Two-Step Key Derivation. ASN.1 format of fixedInfo construction (currently) is NOT supported. * SP 800-56Cr1 - 7 Selecting Hash Functions and MAC Algorithms. The process that goes into the selection of Hash functions and MAC algorithms SHALL NOT be in scope of ACVP testing, though the ACVP server SHALL support all indicated Hash and MAC functions. * SP 800-56Cr1 - 7 Selecting Hash Functions and MAC Algorithms. The process that goes into the selection of Hash functions and MAC algorithms SHALL NOT be in scope of ACVP testing, though the ACVP server SHALL support all indicated Hash and MAC functions. Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 6] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 7. Capabilities Registration ACVP requires crypto modules to register their capabilities. This allows the crypto module to advertise support for specific algorithms, notifying the ACVP server which algorithms need test vectors generated for the validation process. This section describes the constructs for advertising support of KAS ECC algorithms to the ACVP server. The algorithm capabilities MUST be advertised as JSON objects within the 'algorithms' value of the ACVP registration message. The 'algorithms' value is an array, where each array element is an individual JSON object defined in this section. The 'algorithms' value is part of the 'capability_exchange' element of the ACVP JSON registration message. See the ACVP specification [ACVP] for more details on the registration message. 7.1. Prerequisites Each algorithm implementation MAY rely on other cryptographic primitives. For example, RSA Signature algorithms depend on an underlying hash function. Each of these underlying algorithm primitives must be validated, either separately or as part of the same submission. ACVP provides a mechanism for specifying the required prerequisites: Prerequisites, if applicable, MUST be submitted in the registration as the "prereqVals" JSON property array inside each element of the "algorithms" array. Each element in the "prereqVals" array MUST contain the following properties +===============+=============================+===========+ | JSON Property | Description | JSON Type | +===============+=============================+===========+ | algorithm | a prerequisite algorithm | string | +---------------+-----------------------------+-----------+ | valValue | algorithm validation number | string | +---------------+-----------------------------+-----------+ Table 1: Prerequisite Properties A "valValue" of "same" SHALL be used to indicate that the prerequisite is being met by a different algorithm in the capability exchange in the same registration. An example description of prerequisites within a single algorithm capability exchange looks like this Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 7] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 "prereqVals": [ { "algorithm": "Alg1", "valValue": "Val-1234" }, { "algorithm": "Alg2", "valValue": "same" } ] Figure 1 7.2. Prerequisite Algorithms Some algorithm implementations rely on other cryptographic primitives. For example, IKEv2 uses an underlying SHA algorithm. Each of these underlying algorithm primitives must be validated, either separately or as part of the same submission. ACVP provides a mechanism for specifying the required prerequisites: +==============+==============+============+=============+==========+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON Type | Valid | Optional | | | | | Values | | +==============+==============+============+=============+==========+ | algorithm | a | value | CMAC, | No | | | prerequisite | | DRBG, | | | | algorithm | | ECDSA, | | | | | | HMAC, | | | | | | KMAC, SHA, | | | | | | SP800-108 | | +--------------+--------------+------------+-------------+----------+ | valValue | algorithm | value | actual | No | | | validation | | number or | | | | number | | "same" | | +--------------+--------------+------------+-------------+----------+ | prereqAlgVal | prerequistie | object | see above | Yes | | | algorithm | with | | | | | validation | algorithm | | | | | | and | | | | | | valValue | | | | | | properties | | | +--------------+--------------+------------+-------------+----------+ Table 2: Prerequisite Algorithms JSON Values Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 8] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 7.3. Algorithm Capabilities JSON Values Each algorithm capability advertised is a self-contained JSON object using the following values. Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 9] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 +==================+============+============+=============+========+ | JSON Value |Description | JSON Type |Valid Values |Optional| +==================+============+============+=============+========+ | algorithm | The | value | KAS-ECC | No | | | algorithm | | | | | | under test | | | | +------------------+------------+------------+-------------+--------+ | revision | The | value |"Sp800-56Ar3"| No | | | algorithm | | | | | | testing | | | | | |revision to | | | | | | use. | | | | +------------------+------------+------------+-------------+--------+ | prereqVals |Prerequisite| array of | See | No | | | algorithm |prereqAlgVal| Section 7.2 | | | |validations | objects | | | +------------------+------------+------------+-------------+--------+ | function | Type of | array | See | Yes | | | function | | Section 7.4 | | | | supported | | | | +------------------+------------+------------+-------------+--------+ | iutId | The | hex | | No | | | identifier | | | | | |of the IUT. | | | | +------------------+------------+------------+-------------+--------+ | scheme | Array of | object | See | No | | | supported | |Section 7.5.1| | | | key | | | | | | agreement | | | | | |schemes each| | | | | |having their| | | | | | own | | | | | |capabilities| | | | +------------------+------------+------------+-------------+--------+ |domainParameterGen|Array of IUT| array |P-192, P-224,| No | | | supported | |P-256, P-384,| | | | domain | |P-521, K-163,| | | | paameter | |K-233, K-283,| | | | generation | |K-409, K-571,| | | | methods. | |B-163, B-233,| | | | | |B-283, B-409,| | | | | | B-571 | | +------------------+------------+------------+-------------+--------+ Table 3: Capabilities JSON Values Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 10] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 Note: Some optional values are REQUIRED depending on the algorithm. Failure to provide these values will result in the ACVP server returning an error to the ACVP client during registration. 7.4. Supported KAS ECC Functions The following function types MAY be advertised by the ACVP compliant crypto module: * keyPairGen - IUT can perform keypair generation. * partialVal - IUT can perform partial public key validation ([SP800-56Ar3] section 5.6.2.3). * fullVal - IUT can perform full public key validation ( [SP800-56Ar3] section 5.6.2.3). 7.5. KAS ECC Schemes All other scheme capabilities are advertised as a self-contained JSON object using the following values. Note that AT LEAST one valid scheme must be registered. 7.5.1. KAS ECC Scheme Capabilities JSON Values * ephemeralUnified - keyConfirmation not supported. * fullMqv * fullUnified * onePassDh - Can only provide unilateral key confirmation party V to party U. * onePassMqv * onePassUnified * staticUnified Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 11] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 +=======================+================+=======+=========+========+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Valid |Optional| | | | Type | Values | | +=======================+================+=======+=========+========+ | kasRole |Roles supported | array |initiator| No | | | for key | | and/or | | | | agreement | |responder| | +-----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+--------+ | kdfMethods |The KDF methods |object | Section | No | | | to use when | | 7.5.1.1 | | | | testing KAS | | | | | | schemes. | | | | +-----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+--------+ | keyConfirmationMethod | The |object | Section | Yes | | | KeyCnfirmation | | 7.5.1.2 | | | | capabilities | | | | | |(when supported)| | | | | |for the scheme. | | | | +-----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+--------+ | | The length of |integer| 128 | No | | | the key to | | minimum | | | |derive (using a | | without | | | | KDF) or | | KC, 136 | | | |transport (using| | minimum | | | | a KTS scheme). | |with KC, | | | | This value | | maximum | | | |should be large | | 1024. | | | | enough to | | | | | |accommodate the | | | | | |key length used | | | | | | for the mac | | | | | | algorithms in | | | | | | use for key | | | | | | confirmation, | | | | | | ideally the | | | | | | maximum value | | | | | | the IUT can | | | | | | support with | | | | | | their KAS/KTS | | | | | |implementation. | | | | | | Maximum value | | | | | | (for testing | | | | | | purposes) is | | | | | | 1024. | | | | +-----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+--------+ Table 4: Capabilities JSON Values Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 12] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 7.5.1.1. Supported Kdf Methods Note that AT LEAST one KDF Method is required for KAS schemes. The following MAY be advertised by the ACVP compliant crypto module: +============+=====================+========+===========+==========+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Valid | Optional | | | | Type | Values | | +============+=====================+========+===========+==========+ | oneStepKdf | Indicates the IUT | object | Section | Yes | | | will be testing key | | 7.5.1.1.1 | | | | derivation using | | | | | | the SP800-56Cr1 | | | | | | OneStepKdf. | | | | +------------+---------------------+--------+-----------+----------+ | twoStepKdf | Indicates the IUT | object | Section | Yes | | | will be testing key | | 7.5.1.1.2 | | | | derivation using | | | | | | the SP800-56Cr1 | | | | | | TwoStepKdf. | | | | +------------+---------------------+--------+-----------+----------+ Table 5: KDF Options 7.5.1.1.1. One Step KDF Capabilities +==================+===============+======+===============+=========+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Valid Values |Optional | | | | Type | | | +==================+===============+======+===============+=========+ | auxFunctions | The auxiliary |array | See Table 7 | No | | | functions to | of | | | | | use with the |Table | | | | | KDF. | 7 | | | +------------------+---------------+------+---------------+---------+ | fixedInfoPattern | The pattern |string| See Section | No | | | used for | | 7.5.1.1.2 | | | | fixedInfo | | | | | | construction. | | | | +------------------+---------------+------+---------------+---------+ | encoding | The encoding |array | concatenation | No | | | type to use | of | | | | |with fixedInfo |string| | | | | construction. | | | | | | Note | | | | | | concatenation | | | | | | is currently | | | | | | supported. | | | | Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 13] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 | |ASN.1 should be| | | | | | coming. | | | | +------------------+---------------+------+---------------+---------+ Table 6: One Step KDF Options +=================+=============+======+===============+============+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Valid Values | Optional | | | | Type | | | +=================+=============+======+===============+============+ | auxFunctionName |The auxiliary|string| SHA2-224, | No | | | function to | | SHA2-256, | | | | use. | | SHA2-384, | | | | | | SHA2-512, | | | | | | SHA2-512/224, | | | | | | SHA2-512/256, | | | | | | SHA3-224, | | | | | | SHA3-256, | | | | | | SHA3-384, | | | | | |SHA3-512, KMAC-| | | | | | 128, KMAC-256 | | +-----------------+-------------+------+---------------+------------+ | macSaltMethods |How the salt |array |default, random|Not optional| | |is determined| of | | for mac | | | (default |string| | based | | | being all | | | auxiliary | | | 00s, random | | | functions. | | | being a | | | | | |random salt).| | | | +-----------------+-------------+------+---------------+------------+ Table 7: AuxFunction Options 7.5.1.1.2. Two Step KDF Capabilities +==============+===================+=========+========+==========+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Valid | Optional | | | | Type | Values | | +==============+===================+=========+========+==========+ | capabilities | The capabilities | array | See | No | | | supported for the | of | Table | | | | Two Step KDF. | Table 9 | 9 | | +--------------+-------------------+---------+--------+----------+ Table 8: Two Step KDF Options Note this capabilities object is very similar to the capability object from SP800-108. Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 14] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 +==================+=============+=======+===============+==========+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Valid Values | Optional | | | | Type | | | +==================+=============+=======+===============+==========+ | macSaltMethod |How the salt | array |default, random| Not | | |is determined| of | | optional | | | (default |string | | for mac | | | being all | | | based | | | 00s, random | | |auxiliary | | | being a | | |functions.| | |random salt).| | | | +------------------+-------------+-------+---------------+----------+ | fixedInfoPattern | The pattern |string | See | No | | | used for | |Section 7.5.1.3| | | | fixedInfo | | | | | |construction.| | | | +------------------+-------------+-------+---------------+----------+ | encoding |The encoding | array | concatenation | No | | | type to use | of | | | | | with |string | | | | | fixedInfo | | | | | |construction.| | | | | | Note | | | | | |concatenation| | | | | |is currently | | | | | | supported. | | | | | |ASN.1 should | | | | | | be coming. | | | | +------------------+-------------+-------+---------------+----------+ | kdfMode |The strategy |string | counter, | No | | | for running | |fedback, double| | | | the KDF. | | pipeline | | | | | | iteration | | +------------------+-------------+-------+---------------+----------+ | macMode | The macMode | array | CMAC-AES128, | No | | |supported by | of | CMAC-AES192, | | | | the KDF. |string | CMAC-AES256, | | | | | | HMAC-SHA-1, | | | | | |HMAC-SHA2-224, | | | | | |HMAC-SHA2-256, | | | | | |HMAC-SHA2-384, | | | | | |HMAC-SHA2-512, | | | | | | HMAC- | | | | | | SHA2-512/224, | | | | | | HMAC- | | | | | | SHA2-512/256, | | | | | |HMAC-SHA3-224, | | | | | |HMAC-SHA3-256, | | Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 15] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 | | | |HMAC-SHA3-384, | | | | | | HMAC-SHA3-512 | | +------------------+-------------+-------+---------------+----------+ | fixedDataOrder | The counter | array | none, before | No | | | locations | of | fixed data, | | | |supported by |string | after fixed | | | | the KDF. | | data, before | | | | | | iterator | | +------------------+-------------+-------+---------------+----------+ | counterLength | The counter | array | 8, 16, 24, 32 | Not | | | lengths | of | | optional | | |supported for|integer| | for | | | the KDF. | | | counter | | | | | | mode. | +------------------+-------------+-------+---------------+----------+ | supportedLengths |The supported|domain | Single range | No | | | derivation | | (of literal) | | | | lengths. | | expected. | | | | | | Registered | | | | | | value must | | | | | | support the L | | | | | |value provided.| | +------------------+-------------+-------+---------------+----------+ | supportsEmptyIv | The KDF |boolean| true, false | No | | | supports an | | | | | | empty IV | | | | | | (feedback | | | | | | mode). | | | | +------------------+-------------+-------+---------------+----------+ | requiresEmptyIv | The KDF |boolean| true, false | Yes | | | requires an | | | | | | empty IV | | | | | | (feedback | | | | | | mode). | | | | +------------------+-------------+-------+---------------+----------+ Table 9: TwoStepCapabilities Options 7.5.1.2. Supported KeyConfirmation Method +=========================+=============+======+===========+========+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Valid |Optional| | | | Type | Values | | +=========================+=============+======+===========+========+ | macMethods | The MAC |object| Section | No | | | methods to | | 7.5.1.4 | | | | use when | | | | | | testing KAS | | | | Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 16] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 | | or KTS | | | | | |schemes with | | | | | | key | | | | | |confirmation.| | | | +-------------------------+-------------+------+-----------+--------+ |keyConfirmationDirections| The |array |unilateral,| No | | |directions in| | bilateral | | | | which key | | | | | |confirmation | | | | | |is supported.| | | | +-------------------------+-------------+------+-----------+--------+ | keyConfirmationRoles |The roles in |array | provider, | No | | | which key | | recipient | | | |confirmation | | | | | |is supported.| | | | +-------------------------+-------------+------+-----------+--------+ Table 10: KAS ECC KeyConfirmation Capabilities JSON Values 7.5.1.3. FixedInfoPatternConstruction IUTs SHALL be capable of specifying how the FixedInfo is constructed for the KAS/KTS negotiation. Pattern candidates: * literal[0123456789ABCDEF] - uses the specified hex within "[]". literal[0123456789ABCDEF] substitutes "0123456789ABCDEF" in place of the field * uPartyInfo - uPartyId { || ephemeralKey } { || ephemeralNonce } { || dkmNonce } { || c } o "optional" items such as ephemeralKey MUST be included when available for ACVP testing. * vPartyInfo - vPartyId { || ephemeralKey } { || ephemeralNonce } { || dkmNonce } { || c } o "optional" items such as ephemeralKey MUST be included when available for ACVP testing. * context Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 17] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 - Random value chosen by ACVP server to represent the context. * algorithmId - Random value chosen by ACVP server to represent the algorithmId. * label - Random value chosen by ACVP server to represent the label. Example (Note that party U is the server in this case "434156536964", party V is the IUT "a1b2c3d4e5"): * "concatenation" : "literal[123456789CAFECAFE]||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo" Evaluated as: * "123456789CAFECAFE434156536964a1b2c3d4e5" 7.5.1.4. Supported MAC Methods Note that AT LEAST one mac method must be supplied when making use of Key Confirmation. +===================+===================+======+===========+========+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Valid |Optional| | | | Type | Values | | +===================+===================+======+===========+========+ | CMAC | Utilizes CMAC as |object|See Section| Yes | | |the MAC algorithm. | |7.5.1.4.1. | | | | | | Note that | | | | | |the keyLen | | | | | | must be | | | | | | 128, 192, | | | | | |or 256 for | | | | | | this MAC. | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ | HMAC-SHA2-224 | Utilizes HMAC- |object|See Section| Yes | | |SHA2-224 as the MAC| | 7.5.1.4.1 | | | | algorithm. | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ | HMAC-SHA2-256 | Utilizes HMAC- |object|See Section| Yes | | |SHA2-256 as the MAC| | 7.5.1.4.1 | | | | algorithm. | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ | HMAC-SHA2-384 | Utilizes HMAC- |object|See Section| Yes | Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 18] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 | |SHA2-384 as the MAC| | 7.5.1.4.1 | | | | algorithm. | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ | HMAC-SHA2-512 | Utilizes HMAC- |object|See Section| Yes | | |SHA2-512 as the MAC| | 7.5.1.4.1 | | | | algorithm. | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ | HMAC-SHA2-512/224 | Utilizes HMAC- |object|See Section| Yes | | |SHA2-512/224 as the| | 7.5.1.4.1 | | | | MAC algorithm. | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ | HMAC-SHA2-512/256 | Utilizes HMAC- |object|See Section| Yes | | |SHA2-512/256 as the| | 7.5.1.4.1 | | | | MAC algorithm. | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ | HMAC-SHA3-224 | Utilizes HMAC- |object|See Section| Yes | | |SHA3-224 as the MAC| | 7.5.1.4.1 | | | | algorithm. | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ | HMAC-SHA3-256 | Utilizes HMAC- |object|See Section| Yes | | |SHA3-256 as the MAC| | 7.5.1.4.1 | | | | algorithm. | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ | HMAC-SHA3-384 | Utilizes HMAC- |object|See Section| Yes | | |SHA3-384 as the MAC| | 7.5.1.4.1 | | | | algorithm. | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ | HMAC-SHA3-512 | Utilizes HMAC- |object|See Section| Yes | | |SHA3-512 as the MAC| | 7.5.1.4.1 | | | | algorithm. | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ | KMAC-128 | Utilizes KMAC-128 |object|See Section| Yes | | | as the MAC | | 7.5.1.4.1 | | | | algorithm. | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ | KMAC-256 | Utilizes KMAC-256 |object|See Section| Yes | | | as the MAC | | 7.5.1.4.1 | | | | algorithm. | | | | +-------------------+-------------------+------+-----------+--------+ Table 11: MAC Method Options Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 19] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 7.5.1.4.1. Supported MAC Options +========+=================+=========+===================+==========+ | JSON | Description | JSON | Valid Values | Optional | | Value | | Type | | | +========+=================+=========+===================+==========+ | keyLen | The amount of | integer | 128 - 512. Note | No | | | bits from the | | that the DKM is | | | | DKM to pass | | REQUIRED to have | | | | into the | | at least 8 bits | | | | KeyConfirmation | | available after | | | | MAC function. | | subtracting the | | | | | | keyLen | | | | | | specified. | | +--------+-----------------+---------+-------------------+----------+ | macLen | The amount of | integer | 64 - 512. | No | | | bits to use as | | | | | | the tag from | | | | | | the MAC | | | | | | function. | | | | +--------+-----------------+---------+-------------------+----------+ Table 12: MAC Method Base Options 7.6. Example KAS-ECC Registration The following is a example JSON object advertising support for KAS ECC. { "algorithm": "KAS-ECC", "revision": "Sp800-56Ar3", "prereqVals": [ { "algorithm": "ECDSA", "valValue": "123456" }, { "algorithm": "DRBG", "valValue": "123456" }, { "algorithm": "SHA", "valValue": "123456" }, { "algorithm": "KMAC", "valValue": "123456" Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 20] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 }, { "algorithm": "HMAC", "valValue": "123456" } ], "function": [ "keyPairGen", "partialVal" ], "iutId": "123456ABCD", "scheme": { "ephemeralUnified": { "kasRole": [ "initiator", "responder" ], "kdfMethods": { "oneStepKdf": { "auxFunctions": [ { "auxFunctionName": "KMAC-128", "macSaltMethods": [ "default" ] } ], "fixedInfoPattern": "algorithmId||l||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo", "encoding": [ "concatenation" ] }, "twoStepKdf": { "capabilities": [ { "macSaltMethods": [ "random" ], "fixedInfoPattern": "l||label||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo||context", "encoding": [ "concatenation" ], "kdfMode": "feedback", "macMode": [ "HMAC-SHA3-224" ], "supportedLengths": [ 512 Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 21] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 ], "fixedDataOrder": [ "after fixed data" ], "counterLength": [ 32 ], "requiresEmptyIv": false, "supportsEmptyIv": false } ] } }, "l": 512 }, "onePassDh": { "kasRole": [ "initiator", "responder" ], "kdfMethods": { "oneStepKdf": { "auxFunctions": [ { "auxFunctionName": "KMAC-128", "macSaltMethods": [ "default" ] } ], "fixedInfoPattern": "algorithmId||l||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo", "encoding": [ "concatenation" ] }, "twoStepKdf": { "capabilities": [ { "macSaltMethods": [ "random" ], "fixedInfoPattern": "l||label||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo||context", "encoding": [ "concatenation" ], "kdfMode": "feedback", "macMode": [ "HMAC-SHA3-224" Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 22] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 ], "supportedLengths": [ 512 ], "fixedDataOrder": [ "after fixed data" ], "counterLength": [ 32 ], "requiresEmptyIv": false, "supportsEmptyIv": false } ] } }, "keyConfirmationMethod": { "macMethods": { "KMAC-128": { "keyLen": 128, "macLen": 128 } }, "keyConfirmationDirections": [ "unilateral" ], "keyConfirmationRoles": [ "provider", "recipient" ] }, "l": 512 } }, "domainParameterGenerationMethods": [ "P-192" ] } Figure 2 8. Generation Requirements per Party per Scheme The various schemes of KAS all have their own requirements as to keys and nonces per scheme, per party. The below table demonstrates those generation requirements: Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 23] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 +===============+=========+===============+===================+========================+=============+================+==============+========+ | Scheme | KasMode | KasRole |KeyConfirmationRole|KeyConfirmationDirection|StaticKeyPair|EphemeralKeyPair|EphemeralNonce|DkmNonce| +===============+=========+===============+===================+========================+=============+================+==============+========+ | DhHybrid1 |NoKdfNoKc|InitiatorPartyU| None | None | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhHybrid1 |NoKdfNoKc|ResponderPartyV| None | None | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhHybrid1 | KdfNoKc |InitiatorPartyU| None | None | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhHybrid1 | KdfNoKc |ResponderPartyV| None | None | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhHybrid1 | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Provider | Unilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhHybrid1 | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Provider | Bilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhHybrid1 | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Recipient | Unilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhHybrid1 | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Recipient | Bilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhHybrid1 | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Provider | Unilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhHybrid1 | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Provider | Bilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhHybrid1 | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Recipient | Unilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhHybrid1 | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Recipient | Bilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv2 |NoKdfNoKc|InitiatorPartyU| None | None | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv2 |NoKdfNoKc|ResponderPartyV| None | None | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv2 | KdfNoKc |InitiatorPartyU| None | None | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv2 | KdfNoKc |ResponderPartyV| None | None | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv2 | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Provider | Unilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv2 | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Provider | Bilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv2 | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Recipient | Unilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv2 | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Recipient | Bilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv2 | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Provider | Unilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv2 | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Provider | Bilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv2 | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Recipient | Unilateral | True | True | False | False | Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 24] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv2 | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Recipient | Bilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhEphem |NoKdfNoKc|InitiatorPartyU| None | None | False | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhEphem |NoKdfNoKc|ResponderPartyV| None | None | False | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhEphem | KdfNoKc |InitiatorPartyU| None | None | False | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhEphem | KdfNoKc |ResponderPartyV| None | None | False | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ |DhHybridOneFlow|NoKdfNoKc|InitiatorPartyU| None | None | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ |DhHybridOneFlow|NoKdfNoKc|ResponderPartyV| None | None | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ |DhHybridOneFlow| KdfNoKc |InitiatorPartyU| None | None | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ |DhHybridOneFlow| KdfNoKc |ResponderPartyV| None | None | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ |DhHybridOneFlow| KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Provider | Unilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ |DhHybridOneFlow| KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Provider | Bilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ |DhHybridOneFlow| KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Recipient | Unilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ |DhHybridOneFlow| KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Recipient | Bilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ |DhHybridOneFlow| KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Provider | Unilateral | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ |DhHybridOneFlow| KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Provider | Bilateral | True | False | True | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ |DhHybridOneFlow| KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Recipient | Unilateral | True | False | True | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ |DhHybridOneFlow| KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Recipient | Bilateral | True | False | True | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv1 |NoKdfNoKc|InitiatorPartyU| None | None | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv1 |NoKdfNoKc|ResponderPartyV| None | None | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv1 | KdfNoKc |InitiatorPartyU| None | None | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv1 | KdfNoKc |ResponderPartyV| None | None | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv1 | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Provider | Unilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv1 | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Provider | Bilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv1 | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Recipient | Unilateral | True | True | False | False | Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 25] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv1 | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Recipient | Bilateral | True | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv1 | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Provider | Unilateral | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv1 | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Provider | Bilateral | True | False | True | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv1 | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Recipient | Unilateral | True | False | True | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | Mqv1 | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Recipient | Bilateral | True | False | True | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhOneFlow |NoKdfNoKc|InitiatorPartyU| None | None | False | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhOneFlow |NoKdfNoKc|ResponderPartyV| None | None | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhOneFlow | KdfNoKc |InitiatorPartyU| None | None | False | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhOneFlow | KdfNoKc |ResponderPartyV| None | None | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhOneFlow | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Recipient | Unilateral | False | True | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhOneFlow | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Provider | Unilateral | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhStatic |NoKdfNoKc|InitiatorPartyU| None | None | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhStatic |NoKdfNoKc|ResponderPartyV| None | None | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhStatic | KdfNoKc |InitiatorPartyU| None | None | True | False | False | True | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhStatic | KdfNoKc |ResponderPartyV| None | None | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhStatic | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Provider | Unilateral | True | False | False | True | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhStatic | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Provider | Bilateral | True | False | False | True | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhStatic | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Recipient | Unilateral | True | False | False | True | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhStatic | KdfKc |InitiatorPartyU| Recipient | Bilateral | True | False | False | True | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhStatic | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Provider | Unilateral | True | False | False | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhStatic | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Provider | Bilateral | True | False | True | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhStatic | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Recipient | Unilateral | True | False | True | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ | DhStatic | KdfKc |ResponderPartyV| Recipient | Bilateral | True | False | True | False | +---------------+---------+---------------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+----------------+--------------+--------+ Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 26] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 Table 13: Required Party Generation Obligations 9. Test Vectors The ACVP server provides test vectors to the ACVP client, which are then processed and returned to the ACVP server for validation. A typical ACVP validation test session would require multiple test vector sets to be downloaded and processed by the ACVP client. Each test vector set represents an individual algorithm defined during the capability exchange. This section describes the JSON schema for a test vector set used with SP800-56Ar3 KAS ECC algorithms. The test vector set JSON schema is a multi-level hierarchy that contains meta data for the entire vector set as well as individual test vectors to be processed by the ACVP client. The following table describes the JSON elements at the top level of the hierarchy. +=============+======================================+===========+ | JSON Values | Description | JSON Type | +=============+======================================+===========+ | acvVersion | Protocol version identifier | string | +-------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+ | vsId | Unique numeric vector set identifier | integer | +-------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+ | algorithm | Algorithm defined in the capability | string | | | exchange | | +-------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+ | mode | Mode defined in the capability | string | | | exchange | | +-------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+ | revision | Protocol test revision selected | string | +-------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+ | testGroups | Array of test groups containing test | array | | | data, see Section 9.1 | | +-------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+ Table 14: Top Level Test Vector JSON Elements An example of this would look like this { "acvVersion": "version", "vsId": 1, "algorithm": "Alg1", "mode": "Mode1", "revision": "Revision1.0", "testGroups": [ ... ] } Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 27] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 Figure 3 9.1. Test Groups JSON Schema The testGroups element at the top level in the test vector JSON object is an array of test groups. Test vectors are grouped into similar test cases to reduce the amount of data transmitted in the vector set. For instance, all test vectors that use the same key size would be grouped together. The Test Group JSON object contains meta data that applies to all test vectors within the group. The following table describes the secure hash JSON elements of the Test Group JSON object. The test group for KAS/KTS ECC is as follows: +==============================+=============+========+=============+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Optional | | | | Type | | +==============================+=============+========+=============+ | tgId | Numeric | value | No | | | identifier | | | | |for the test | | | | |group, unique| | | | | across the | | | | |entire vector| | | | | set. | | | +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | testType | The type of | value | No | | |test for the | | | | |group (AFT or| | | | | VAL). | | | +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | scheme |The scheme in| value | No | | | use for the | | | | | group. See | | | | |Section 7.5.1| | | | |for possible | | | | | values. | | | +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | kasRole | The group | value | No | | |role from the| | | | | perspective | | | | | of the IUT. | | | +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | |The length of| value | No | | | key to | | | | | derive/ | | | | | transport. | | | Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 28] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | iutId | The Iut's | value | No | | | identifier. | | | +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | serverId | The ACVP | value | No | | | server's | | | | | identifier. | | | +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | kdfConfiguration | The KDF |Object, | No | | |configuration| See | | | | for the |Section | | | | group. | 9.1.1 | | +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | macConfiguration | The MAC |Object, |Not optional | | |configuration| See | for schemes | | | for the |Section | using key | | | group. | 9.1.2 |confirmation.| +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | keyConfirmationDirection | The key | value | Yes | | |confirmation | | | | | direction. | | | +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | keyConfirmationRole | The key | value | Yes | | |confirmation | | | | | role. | | | +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ |domainParameterGenerationMode | The domain | value | No | | | parameter | | | | | type used. | | | +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ | tests |The tests for|Array of| No | | | the group. |objects,| | | | | See | | | | |Section | | | | | 9.2. | | +------------------------------+-------------+--------+-------------+ Table 15: Vector Group JSON Object 9.1.1. KDF Configuration JSON Schema Describes the KDF configuration for use under the test group. Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 29] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 +===================+==================+==============+=============+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON Type | Optional | +===================+==================+==============+=============+ | kdfType | The type of | value - | No | | | KDF to use for | onestep, | | | | the group. | twostep | | +-------------------+------------------+--------------+-------------+ | satMethod | The strategy | value - | No | | | used for | default (all | | | | salting. | 00s), random | | +-------------------+------------------+--------------+-------------+ | fixedInfoPattern | The pattern | value - See | No | | | used for | Section | | | | constructing | 7.5.1.3. | | | | the fixedInfo. | | | +-------------------+------------------+--------------+-------------+ | fixedInfoEncoding | The pattern | value - See | No | | | used for | Section | | | | constructing | 7.5.1.3. | | | | the fixedInfo. | | | +-------------------+------------------+--------------+-------------+ | auxFunction | The auxiliary | value - See | Not | | | function used | Table 7. | optional | | | in the KDF. | | for | | | | | OneStepKdf. | +-------------------+------------------+--------------+-------------+ | macMode | The MAC | value - See | Not | | | function used | Table 9. | optional | | | in the KDF. | | for | | | | | TwoStepKdf. | +-------------------+------------------+--------------+-------------+ | counterLocation | The counter | value | Yes | | | location. | | | +-------------------+------------------+--------------+-------------+ | counterLen | The counter | value | Yes | | | length. | | | +-------------------+------------------+--------------+-------------+ | ivLen | The iv length. | value | Yes | +-------------------+------------------+--------------+-------------+ Table 16: KdfConfiguration JSON Object 9.1.2. MAC Configuration JSON Schema Describes the key confirmation MAC configuration for use under the test group. Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 30] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 +=========+===============+==============================+==========+ | JSON | Description | JSON Type | Optional | | Value | | | | +=========+===============+==============================+==========+ | macType | The macType | value - HMAC-SHA2-224, | No | | | used in key | HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC- | | | | confirmation. | SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512, | | | | | HMAC-SHA2-512/224, HMAC- | | | | | SHA2-512/256, HMAC- | | | | | SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, | | | | | HMAC-SHA3-384, HMAC- | | | | | SHA3-512, CMAC, KMAC- | | | | | 128, KMAC-256 | | +---------+---------------+------------------------------+----------+ | keyLen | The number of | value | No | | | bits to take | | | | | from the DKM | | | | | to use for | | | | | the mac key | | | | | in key | | | | | confirmation. | | | +---------+---------------+------------------------------+----------+ | macLen | The number of | value | No | | | bits to use | | | | | for the MAC | | | | | tag. | | | +---------+---------------+------------------------------+----------+ Table 17: MacConfiguration JSON Object 9.2. Test Case JSON Schema Each test group contains an array of one or more test cases. Each test case is a JSON object that represents a single test vector to be processed by the ACVP client. The following table describes the JSON elements for each KAS/KTS ECC test vector. +===========================+================+=========+==========+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Optional | | | | Type | | +===========================+================+=========+==========+ | tcId | Numeric | value | No | | | identifier for | | | | | the test case, | | | | | unique across | | | | | the entire | | | | | vector set. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 31] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 | ephemeralPublicKeyIutX | The IUT's | value | Yes | | | ephemeral | | | | | public key X | | | | | value. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | ephemeralPublicKeyIutY | The IUT's | value | Yes | | | ephemeral | | | | | public key Y | | | | | value. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | staticPublicKeyIutX | The IUT's | value | Yes | | | static public | | | | | key X value. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | staticPublicKeyIutY | The IUT's | value | Yes | | | static public | | | | | key Y value. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | ephemeralPublicKeyServerX | The Server's | value | Yes | | | ephemeral | | | | | public key X | | | | | value. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | ephemeralPublicKeyServerY | The Server's | value | Yes | | | ephemeral | | | | | public key Y | | | | | value. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | staticPublicKeyServerX | The Server's | value | Yes | | | static public | | | | | key X value. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | staticPublicKeyServerY | The Server's | value | Yes | | | static public | | | | | key Y value. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | dkmNonceIut | The IUT's | value | Yes | | | nonce used in | | | | | static schemes | | | | | for Key | | | | | Confirmation. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | ephemeralNonceIut | The IUT's | value | Yes | | | ephemeral | | | | | nonce used in | | | | | some schemes. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | dkmNonceServer | The Server's | value | Yes | Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 32] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 | | nonce used in | | | | | static schemes | | | | | for Key | | | | | Confirmation. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | ephemeralNonceServer | The Server's | value | Yes | | | ephemeral | | | | | nonce used in | | | | | some schemes. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | staticPrivateKeyIut | The IUT's | value | Yes | | | static private | | | | | key. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | ephemeralPrivateKeyIut | The IUT's | value | Yes | | | ephemeral | | | | | private key. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | kdfParameter | The KDF | value - | Yes | | | parameters for | See | | | | this test | Section | | | | case. | 9.2.1. | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | dkm | The derived | value | Yes | | | keying | | | | | material. | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ | tag | The tag | value | Yes | | | generated as a | | | | | part of key | | | | | conformation | | | | | (from the IUT | | | | | perspective). | | | +---------------------------+----------------+---------+----------+ Table 18: Test Case JSON Object 9.2.1. KDF Parameter JSON Schema KDF specific options used for the test case. Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 33] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 +=============+==================================+=======+==========+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Optional | | | | Type | | +=============+==================================+=======+==========+ | kdfType | The type of KDF | value | No | | | utilized. | | | +-------------+----------------------------------+-------+----------+ | salt | The salt used for the | value | Yes | | | test case. | | | +-------------+----------------------------------+-------+----------+ | iv | The iv used for the | value | Yes | | | test case. | | | +-------------+----------------------------------+-------+----------+ | algorithmId | The random "algorithID" | value | Yes | | | used for the test case | | | | | when applicable to the | | | | | fixedInfo pattern. | | | +-------------+----------------------------------+-------+----------+ | context | The random "context" | value | Yes | | | used for the test case | | | | | when applicable to the | | | | | fixedInfo pattern. | | | +-------------+----------------------------------+-------+----------+ | label | The random "label" used | value | Yes | | | for the test case when | | | | | applicable to the | | | | | fixedInfo pattern. | | | +-------------+----------------------------------+-------+----------+ Table 19: KDF Parameter JSON Object 9.3. Example Test Vectors JSON Object KAS-FFC The following is a example JSON object for KAS-FFC test vectors sent from the ACVP server to the crypto module. { "vsId": 0, "algorithm": "KAS-ECC", "revision": "Sp800-56Ar3", "testGroups": [ { "tgId": 1, "testType": "AFT", "tests": [ { "staticPublicServerX": "B7A4DDA5DC3A317647B39F39E05390A88F12F53861C24635", "staticPublicServerY": "CA2776BF6A0F35B727F3057340E89A1600915B81BB2E87B7", Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 34] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 "tcId": 1, "ephemeralNonceServer": "44588073AACC3CFD6C9A5E2A0973B6BDDFC35F67EEA96FD0B070DF05F24A4B381F05CE9ACC67739B157CF8EE7459A64E", "kdfParameter": { "kdfType": "oneStep", "salt": "00000000000000000000000000000000", "algorithmId": "A51CF275ABE573209CBC606A934352FE" } } ], "domainParameterGenerationMode": "P-192", "scheme": "staticUnified", "kasRole": "initiator", "l": 512, "iutId": "123456ABCD", "serverId": "434156536964", "kdfConfiguration": { "kdfType": "oneStep", "saltMethod": "default", "fixedInfoPattern": "algorithmId||l||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo", "fixedInfoEncoding": "concatenation", "auxFunction": "KMAC-128" }, "macConfiguration": { "macType": "KMAC-128", "keyLen": 128, "macLen": 128 }, "keyConfirmationDirection": "unilateral", "keyConfirmationRole": "provider" }, { "tgId": 2, "testType": "VAL", "tests": [ { "staticPublicServerX": "87F6D507656EBC3D4D655FD4C0F13BE0F98D5B7472A3B247", "staticPublicServerY": "CFBC8EE38F4EF2DF1B97BF410ABCF4968F1115E7B80E34C6", "staticPrivateIut": "F43B6F08F570D469ED31CF920516114B1B5E3C3C7BDD6B14", "staticPublicIutX": "7573E06C6BACA56D5AFD08A1A014776BDDA7F4593645A07D", "staticPublicIutY": "93D0C1CDC5C23BD045AD6258448436A55E3C310B4333F551", "tcId": 21, "ephemeralNonceServer": "6F4C587D3CEF0B1D0D5B359B18FFB8B72C879EB3997E768826552082D56931D965E7F315FD7254C434871FA1E160873F", "dkmNonceIut": "AB5CCC3B75AA1FB85D28D5D53126B362AAABA3C51D427B6D138BEFD7EE636E1BC239FB45630BF6D7F0E80B59835916B9", "kdfParameter": { "kdfType": "oneStep", "salt": "00000000000000000000000000000000", "algorithmId": "342BCBC9DE15458BCA294BD16FFA10A7" }, Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 35] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 "dkm": "B9FDC93EA0B6A7906C6DB8EC17475B3073A8AD1C24CB1287AB8A6AEA46CABA4FDFD7B0CB77F74CDCF3DFF8DCC41560CF", "tag": "3279D63C9192B7FEF71F6735921B3B46" } ], "domainParameterGenerationMode": "P-192", "scheme": "staticUnified", "kasRole": "initiator", "l": 512, "iutId": "123456ABCD", "serverId": "434156536964", "kdfConfiguration": { "kdfType": "oneStep", "saltMethod": "default", "fixedInfoPattern": "algorithmId||l||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo", "fixedInfoEncoding": "concatenation", "auxFunction": "KMAC-128" }, "macConfiguration": { "macType": "KMAC-128", "keyLen": 128, "macLen": 128 }, "keyConfirmationDirection": "unilateral", "keyConfirmationRole": "provider" } ] } Figure 4 10. Test Vector Responses After the ACVP client downloads and processes a vector set, it MUST send the response vectors back to the ACVP server. The following table describes the JSON object that represents a vector set response. Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 36] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 +============+============================+=======+==========+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Optional | | | | type | | +============+============================+=======+==========+ | acvVersion | Protocol version | value | No | | | identifier | | | +------------+----------------------------+-------+----------+ | vsId | Unique numeric identifier | value | No | | | for the vector set | | | +------------+----------------------------+-------+----------+ | testGroups | Array of JSON objects that | array | No | | | represent each test vector | | | | | group. See Table 21. | | | +------------+----------------------------+-------+----------+ Table 20: Vector Set Response JSON Object The testGroups section is used to organize the ACVP client response in a similar manner to how it receives vectors. Several algorithms SHALL require the client to send back group level properties in their response. This structure helps accommodate that. +=======+========================================+=======+==========+ | JSON | Description | JSON | Optional | | Value | | type | | +=======+========================================+=======+==========+ | tgId | The test group Id | value | No | +-------+----------------------------------------+-------+----------+ | tests | Array of JSON objects that | array | No | | | represent each test vector | | | | | group. See Table 22. | | | +-------+----------------------------------------+-------+----------+ Table 21: Vector Set Group Response JSON Object The testCase section is used to organize the ACVP client response in a similar manner to how it receives vectors. Several algorithms SHALL require the client to send back group level properties in their response. This structure helps accommodate that. +========================+=====================+=========+==========+ | JSON Value | Description | JSON | Optional | | | | type | | +========================+=====================+=========+==========+ | tcId | The test case Id | value | No | +------------------------+---------------------+---------+----------+ | testPassed | Used in VAL test | boolean | Yes | | | types, should the | | | Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 37] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 | | KAS/KTS | | | | | negotiation have | | | | | succeeded? | | | +------------------------+---------------------+---------+----------+ | ephemeralPublicKeyIutX | The IUT's | value | Yes | | | ephemeral public | | | | | key X value. | | | +------------------------+---------------------+---------+----------+ | ephemeralPublicKeyIutY | The IUT's | value | Yes | | | ephemeral public | | | | | key Y value. | | | +------------------------+---------------------+---------+----------+ | staticPublicKeyIutX | The IUT's static | value | Yes | | | public key X | | | | | value. | | | +------------------------+---------------------+---------+----------+ | staticPublicKeyIutX | The IUT's static | value | Yes | | | public key Y | | | | | value. | | | +------------------------+---------------------+---------+----------+ | dkmNonceIut | The IUT's nonce | value | Yes | | | used in static | | | | | schemes for Key | | | | | Confirmation. | | | +------------------------+---------------------+---------+----------+ | ephemeralNonceIut | The IUT's | value | Yes | | | ephemeral nonce | | | | | used in some | | | | | schemes. | | | +------------------------+---------------------+---------+----------+ | dkm | The derived | value | Yes | | | keying material. | | | +------------------------+---------------------+---------+----------+ | tag | The tag generated | value | Yes | | | as a part of key | | | | | confirmation | | | | | (from the IUT | | | | | perspective). | | | +------------------------+---------------------+---------+----------+ Table 22: Vector Set Test Case Response JSON Object 10.1. Example Test Results KAS-ECC JSON Object The following is an example JSON object for KAS-ECC test results sent from the crypto module to the ACVP server. Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 38] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 [ { "acvVersion": "version" }, { "vsId": 0, "algorithm": "KAS-ECC", "revision": "Sp800-56Ar3", "testGroups": [ { "tgId": 1, "tests": [ { "staticPublicIutX": "ED9CF3FE1B79D014F7FF60DFDBFC19457C4F3EBEB0BB10B5", "staticPublicIutY": "5CA8819BC0D39E67AE9AB4747DC563ADA1AE1E9DBA12C272", "tcId": 1, "dkmNonceIut": "215D9AB3A371B395802FD0FCD97815EDFC468DC631735BAEEA0F18498EFC3B52BBABD2B953DE7B64EF20D899093B031D", "dkm": "56505307C7F11F4640C96D863FA3634120F2B2CAB262AE29B1CD26252BC1537E84DF3EB75C1E240983B599B30690F9B0", "tag": "CE39683069F0DA7624F72086FB4B2B8E" } ] }, { "tgId": 3, "tests": [ { "tcId": 21, "testPassed": true } ] } ] } ] Figure 5 11. Security Considerations There are no additional security considerations outside of those outlined in the ACVP document. 12. IANA Considerations This document does not require any action by IANA. 13. Normative references Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 39] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", IETF RFC 2119, IETF RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC3526] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", IETF RFC 3526, IETF RFC 3526, DOI 10.17487/RFC3526, May 2003, . [RFC7919] Gillmor, D., "Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", IETF RFC 7919, IETF RFC 7919, DOI 10.17487/RFC7919, August 2016, . [RFC7991] Hoffman, P., "The "xml2rfc" Version 3 Vocabulary", IETF RFC 7991, IETF RFC 7991, DOI 10.17487/RFC7991, December 2016, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", IETF RFC 8174, IETF RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [ACVP] Hammett, R., Fussell, B., Vassilev, A., and H. Booth, "Automatic Cryptographic Validation Protocol", 2019. [SP800-108] Chen, L., "SP800-108 Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions", 2009, . [FIPS186-4] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", 2013, . [SP800-56Ar3] Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R. Davis, "SP800-56Ar3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key- Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", 2018, . Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 40] Internet-Draft ACVP KAS ECC SP800-56Ar3 August 2020 [SP800-56Cr1] Barker, E., Chen, L., and R. Davis, "SP800-56Cr1 Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key- Establishment Schemes", 2018, . Author's Address Russell Hammett (editor) Email: russ.hammett@hii-tsd.com Hammett Expires 11 February 2021 [Page 41]